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Abstract This study deals with the effect of microcredit on women’s livelihood
and empowerment in rural areas of Coˆte d’Ivoire. A cross-section survey was
conducted among 185 borrowers from two microfinance institutions and 209 non-
borrowers in rural areas of Coˆte d’Ivoire. In addition, a focus group discussion was
held with each of the two women groups. After matching the two groups on the
probability of obtaining credit, we found that the microcredit group on average had
a higher income and a higher value of household assets than the non-borrowers. No
differences in the value of personal women’s assets were found. Furthermore, on
one hand women’s decision-making power in the household, as indicated by their
strategic gender needs, was positively related to the probability of obtaining mi-
crocredit. On the other hand receiving microcredit tended to increase their decision-
making power.
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1 Introduction
Poverty still exists everywhere in the world. The number of extreme poor in the
developing regions was about 1.4 billion in 2008 (UNDP 2012). Despite the fact
that some progress in poverty reduction has been made over the last few years, the
share of the poor in sub-Saharan Africa remains over 40 % compared to Asia and
the Pacific, where the share of the poor fell from 30 % in 1990 to 9 % in 2004
(Ravallion et al. 2007). This study deals with the issue of poverty and the search for
strategies to mitigate its effects on household livelihoods in Coˆte d’Ivoire. A
promising strategy is the provision of microfinance as a credit institution for poor
people who have no access to a formal bank. Microfinance institutions (henceforth
MFIs) enable the poor to undertake income-generating activities to improve their
livelihoods and can help them cope with shocks and uncertainties.
Worldwide, women are more likely to be poor than men. Of all people living in
extreme poverty in developing countries, an estimated 70 % are women (World
Bank 2007). Women are poorer than men because they often lack access to
economic resources and opportunities, education and support services, and do not
have access to land. Nevertheless, women contribute to the physical work in farm
production and support the livelihood of the farm household in many countries
(Ellis 2000). Women increasingly take charge of farm activities because of male
labour out-migration from rural areas, war, and HIV-related morbidity and
mortality, a trend called ‘‘feminisation of agriculture’’ (Cornhiel 2006; FAO
1999, 2005).
Feminisation of agriculture increases the urgency to enhance women’s ability to
carry out their agricultural and non-agricultural activities and their other household
tasks. Microfinance can address this issue by enabling women to generate income
and empower them. By empowerment we mean that women’s capacity to make
meaningful and positive choices is enhanced because of their increased access to
resources they can use to exercise their agency (Kabeer 2005; Niehof 2007). Kabeer
(2005: 16) refers to this as ‘‘transformative forms of agency that do not simply
address immediate inequalities but are used to initiate longer-term processes of
change in the structures of patriarchy.’’
Microfinance could be such a resource. However, Bangladesh data (Kabeer 2001;
Ali and Niehof 2007) reveal that women’s access to microfinance does not
necessarily lead to transformative agency but could result in ‘‘pseudo-empower-
ment,’’ where husbands and sons urge their wives and mothers to obtain a loan but
saddle them with the burden of repayment and suffering the consequences of
default. This implies that it is important that in judging the effectiveness of
microfinance for women’s empowerment, the intra-household context of gender
relations should be taken into account.
Women in Coˆte d’Ivoire contribute to both food crop and cash crop production.
They also dominate the informal sector. However, Ivorian women have achieved
little improvement in agricultural productivity and the country is not yet self-
sufficient in food production. Women’s incomes are low as a consequence of low
productivity, caused by a lack of resources to acquire modern inputs or engage in
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new income-generating activities. In this context the state of Coˆte d’Ivoire is
committed to supporting women financially through microfinance.
Microfinance programmes have been promoted since the early 1990s in order to
help women to improve their livelihood and that of their families and to positively
contribute to the economic growth of the country. However, despite the proliferation
of MFI programmes and the fact that it has been more than a decade since they were
first implemented, there is little empirical research on the effectiveness of providing
loans for the rural population in general and for rural women in particular.
Specially, little is known about gender relations within the household in relation to
women’s access to and the use of microfinance services.
This paper presents a study about women’s decision-making power, their control
over loans in relation to the gendered intra-household relationships, and the effects
of microfinance on their income and wealth. Since we are not aware of any other
studies on these issues in Coˆte d’Ivoire and this is our first study, the results should
be considered as exploratory.
2 Theory
This section presents an analysis of the state of poverty in Africa and the role of
microfinance in poverty reduction. It also deals with the needs of women and how
microfinance can help to meet these needs.
2.1 Microfinance and poverty
In developing countries, especially in Africa, poverty has the highest prevalence in
rural areas, where agricultural production is the key activity (ADB 2000; UNDP
1997). Rural households in general and women in particular face difficulties in
generating income from agriculture due to the low level of productivity, which has
to do with lack of resources for buying adequate inputs (Whitehead and Kabeer
2002). These constraints prevent the poor from achieving food and livelihood
security.
In rural areas, men and women need financial support to invest in agricultural
production and non-agricultural income-generating activities such as small trade,
food processing, handicraft activities, etc. They may also need credit for
consumption, especially during lean periods. However, poor households generally
have limited access to formal banks to borrow from. First, because they are not able
to provide the collateral required by the banks as they do not own land or cannot
prove legal ownership. Second, because the scale of transactions related to their
activities is small and therefore results in high transaction costs (Moll 2005).
Other than regular banks, MFIs normally provide comprehensive packages,
including small loans, saving facilities, payment services, money transfers and in
some cases insurance, to poor and low-income households. MFIs also provide
training and information about running a business. By doing so, microfinance is
seen as a means to alleviate poverty. By giving financial services to the poor,
microfinance may enable them to build up assets, launch new income-generating
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activities or develop their economic activities, participate in a free market economy,
smooth their consumption and reduce their vulnerability to risks and external shocks
like drought, famine, illness, and floods. Research on poverty and food insufficiency
in the U.S. (Leete and Bania 2010) indicates that liquidity constrained households in
particular are vulnerable to food insufficiency and that availability of credit could
mitigate this effect. By providing these services, MFIs can empower poor people,
particularly poor women, and strengthen economic and social structures (ADB
2000; Greeley 2003; Mayoux 1999; Morduch 1999; Rahman 2004; Van Maanen
2004). This explains the commitment of governments, international donors and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to support and implement microfinance
programmes (Hulme 2000; Mayoux 1999; Simanowitz 2004).
In most countries, women have been the primary target of microfinance
initiatives. According to the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report (2005) in a
sample of 3,100 programmes, 83.5 % of the clients are women, as are 95 % of
Grameen’s clients (Armenda`riz and Morduch 2005). Women are targeted for many
reasons. The first is related to the greater poverty of women than men, particularly
in developing countries. Women are poor because often they do not participate in
the labour market and because even if they do, any assets they have are controlled
by men. Despite their involvement in the agricultural sector as well as their
predominance in the informal sector, many women especially in rural Sub-Saharan
Africa areas still achieve only low productivity, as they lack resources (Whitehead
and Kabeer 2002). So, providing financial services for women may enable them to
carry out income-generating activities and increase their productivity and income.
Evidence from respectively Bangladesh and from the summary of the results of an
evaluation by IFPRI suggests that loans to women result in meeting social goals like
improving household food consumption, health and education (Khandker 2003;
Skoufias 2001).
The second reason for lending money to women is financial. Studies conducted in
Malawi, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Nigeria showed that women generally seem to
be more credit-worthy than men because they have a better repayment record and
are recognised for their dynamism, hard work, skills and entrepreneurial spirit
(Hulme 1991; Khandker et al. 1995; Niehof 2007; Udong et al. 2010). Moreover,
women use money for the benefit of the household, especially their children,
whereas men are considered as tempted to use their earnings more to satisfy their
own needs instead of investing it in business or using it to improve their household’s
welfare (FAO 2000). Additionally, Armenda`riz and Morduch (2005) pointed out
that women tend to be less mobile and more at home than men. This is an advantage
for MFIs because it becomes easier and less costly for MFI managers to monitor
them. Also for group borrowing it is important that the female members work in
each other’s proximity.
The general enthusiasm about microfinance should not obscure the fact that,
despite its potential, the effects of microfinance on poverty remain contested. Based
on the results of their study in seven developing countries, Hulme and Mosley
(1996) concluded that microfinance interventions were ineffective in reducing
poverty among the very poor. Chua et al. (2000) found that the lending outreach of
MFIs to poor borrowers is limited and then argued that this limited participation of
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the poor is proof that the programme failed to alleviate poverty. A study in Malawi
(Diagne 1998) showed that microfinance programmes resulted in a decrease in
households’ net crop income and food consumption. Access to credit had led
farmers to respond to an increase in input prices by borrowing rather than changing
their farming strategies. Rahman (1999) found that women in Bangladesh used their
savings and household assets for consumption and that they diverted loans for
consumption needs or used new loans to pay instalments. According to Armenda`riz
and Roome (2008), the exclusion of men from access to subsidised finance may
create friction and cause backlash effects that diminish the supportive role of
women in their households regarding the provision of health and education. They
call it the women-disempowering effect. Goetz and Gupta (1996) also found that
borrowers of rural credit programme in Bangladesh diverted their loans for
consumption or to repay their old loans. Other research yielded similar findings
(Buckley 1997; Johnson and Kidder 1999; Kabeer 2001; Mayoux 1999; White and
Robinson 2000). In some cases, as indicated in the study done by Coleman (2006) in
Thailand, the MFI programmes do not reach the poor as much as the relatively
wealthy. In addition, women borrowers may be subject to group pressure, resulting
in intimidation and violence against them (Karim 2001). Finally, a loan becomes a
debt, and the poor have no source of income to repay their loans (Rogaly 1996).
Accordingly, Amin et al. (2003) concluded that the vulnerable poor borrowers of
MFIs were further impoverished.
Other studies have found positive effects on poverty alleviation. According to
Pitt and Khandker (1998) microfinance programmes in Bangladesh contribute to an
increase in women’s independent income and a net increase in household
consumption. They also found that the marginal effect of the size of MFI loan on
consumption was 18 % for women and 11 % for men and that there was a strong
effect on schooling of girls due to women’s participation in MFIs. Sebstad and Chen
(1996) found an increase of 25–40 % in enterprise earnings and household income
as a result of access to loans. Hulme and Mosley (1996) and Mosley (2001) found
that the incomes of poor borrowers had increased more than the incomes of the
control group (non-borrowers). Chua et al. (2000) concluded that microfinance
services helped clients build up all kinds of assets, and also enabled them to
diversify their sources of income. Several studies suggest that lending to women
does improve household incomes and leads to other benefits like increased
livelihood diversification, more market activity, more education and better health
(Morduch and Haley 2002; Mosley and Rock 2004; Todd 1996; Zaman 2004).
2.2 Gender needs and microfinance
Both within households and in society at large, men and women have different needs
because of their gender roles and they have unequal control over resources (Moser
1993). Moser (1989, 1993) defined two types of women’s needs: practical gender
needs (PGN) and strategic gender needs (SGN). The first refers to the needs that result
from the concrete conditions women experience in society in terms of reproductive
work (childbearing and child care, cooking, cleaning, fetching firewood, carrying
water, etc.), productive work (production of food and cash crops or generating income
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by food processing, craft work, or trade), and community activities. If women’s PGN
are met, for example by good access to water sources, household welfare is enhanced.
SGN address fundamental relationships between men and women regarding the
division of labour, decision-making power, control over resources, subordination of
women and political rights. They are also related to women’s lack of resources, low
level of education, and poverty risk compared to that of men (Molyneux 1985). The
two sets of needs are different but related. While better meeting PGN may have no
effect on meeting SGN, empowering women by meeting their SGN increases their
decision-making power which they can use to help meeting their practical needs as
women. For example, to ensure rural households’ better access to improved water
sources (PGN) women need to have an active voice in the design and management of
rural water schemes (SGN) (cf. Cleaver and Hamada 2010). Being empowered,
women can achieve greater equality, change their existing roles and challenge their
subordinate position (Kabeer 2001). By giving financial support to women’s
activities, MFIs can strengthen women’s fall-back position and bargaining power,
thereby addressing both their practical and strategic gender needs (ADB 2000; Goetz
and Gupta 1996; Mayoux 1999). However, little is known about how by supporting
women’s business activities, microfinance programmes can in fact help women to
meet their household responsibilities as well as improve their power position within
the household and beyond.
Holvoet (2005) found in her research in South India that membership in women’s
groups shifts overall decision-making patterns from norm-guided behaviour and
male decision making to more joint and female decision making. Armenda`riz and
Roome (2008) found that providing women with MFI loans can result in higher
income in the hands of women which might be used in health improvement and
education of the women and their children. They call this the women empowering
effect. Furthermore, women’s gain in decision-making power within the household
may increase their chance to obtain MFI credit.
However, studies have also argued that income earning does not always lead to
the improvement of women’s bargaining power in the household. For example,
using evidence from Mexico, Gonzales de la Rocha (1994) and Laier (1997) argued
that this situation may happen when women do not control household resources and
their wages for cultural and ideological reasons, i.e. that women are subordinated to
their husbands (Ali and Niehof 2007). Likewise, Garikipati (2008) found in India
that lending to women is likely to strengthen the household’s ability to cope with
vulnerability across income groups but that the women themselves, especially the
poorest ones, are not likely to see consistent improvements in their household status.
Evidence from Bangladesh (Goetz and Gupta 1996) suggests that microfinance does
not increase women’s bargaining power entirely because on average women
borrowers surrender nearly 40 % of their control over the investment decisions they
make to their husbands. More alarmingly, over 90 % of the returns these women
realise from their investments are handled by their husbands. Hence, income gained
by women does not always lead to their empowerment. Factors other than income
may have an influence on women’s decision-making power within the household.
In this study, we hypothesize that women with MFI credit have more income and
wealth, and more power in household decision making, indicating that strategic
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gender needs (SGN) are better met, than women without MFI credit. Furthermore,
women who have obtained MFI credit have more power (SGN) in household
decision-making than before taking credit. As the fulfilment of practical gender
needs is only indirectly accomplished, via meeting strategic gender needs, we have
no hypothesis on the effect of microcredit on PGN. In turn, power in household
decision-making increases the chances of obtaining MFI credit.
3 Methods
3.1 Study area and MFI coverage
This study was conducted in Abengourou located in the Central Eastern region of
Coˆte d’Ivoire. The region of Abengourou occupies a surface area of 5,200 km2 and
has a population of about 288,200 (INS 2008). The Agni are the dominant ethnic
group in the area. Among the Agni a matrilineal kinship system prevails. However,
women cannot directly inherit land. Land is passed on through male maternal
descendants. Land is male property that is inherited by nephews from their maternal
uncle. Hence, women by themselves have no direct access to land. Married women
are allowed to use their husband’s land for the house-hold’s agricultural production,
but they cannot claim rights on land as an asset (Binate´ Fofana 2010). During the
1980s, the Abengourou region was the leading producer of coffee and cocoa, the
most important export products of the country. The region is still one of the main
agricultural production regions, with coffee, cocoa and staple crops as the core
products. Women are the main producers of staple crops (cassava, maize, plantain,
peanut) and horticultural crops (peanut, eggplant, hot pepper, okra, tomato, etc.),
while men are engaged in cash crop production (mostly coffee and cocoa). In
addition, women are engaged in the trade of agricultural products and non-
agricultural goods of which they control the proceeds.
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are present and contribute to the development of
the region, in particular the National Union of Credit and Saving Cooperatives of
Coˆte d’Ivoire (COOPEC), and the Mutual Savings and Credit Network (CMEC).
These two MFIs have been selected for inclusion in this study because they are the
most important microfinance institutions in the country and are the sole
microfinance institutions in the study area. COOPEC has set up a special credit
programme for women, called Women Access to Financial Services (AFISEF),
which gives technical and managerial support to female borrowers. In contrast to
COOPEC, the services provided by CMEC for women are limited to credit.
However, CMEC provides group lending, in addition to individual loans.
3.2 Sample and data collection methods
A cross-sectional survey among women was conducted in 2006. In addition
qualitative research was done to gain understanding about the socio-cultural factors
affecting women’s decision-making power and control over the use of loans.
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The study’s units of analysis were women who borrowed money from
microfinance institutions. For a proper assessment of the effects of microfinance
on women’s livelihoods, the study also included female non-borrowers as a control
group. Finally, the microfinance institutions (COOPEC and CMEC) formed a
different type of research unit, studied in order to understand their functioning and
the extent to which they were achieving their goal of poverty alleviation.
The study sample comprised a total number of 185 adult women who had
borrowed money either from COOPEC (95 women) or CMEC (90 women) and who
were engaged in agricultural or non-agricultural activities. The control group
(without MFI credit) consisted of 209 adult women who were also engaged in
agricultural or non-agricultural activities. Multi-stage sampling was used to select
the study sample: first, village sampling and, second, sampling of the women within
the villages. Three villages (Appronpron, Sankadiokro and Ame´le´kia) were selected
from a list of twelve with CMEC presence. The reason for selecting only three
villages out of twelve where CMEC is present is primarily that before the fieldwork
period some CMEC institutions were not functioning well due to a high level of
default. For COOPEC, two out of four villages were selected (Zaranou and
Ebilassokro). In the other two villages, COOPEC activities were just set up, so the
period of loan provision was too short to conduct the survey. Within the selected
villages, the respondents were randomly selected. A written questionnaire was used
to collect empirical data through face-to-face interviews.
Although there may be larger samples used in some other studies, the sample size
of our exploratory study of 394 respondents is in line with those of several other
studies in this field, including Bauer et al. (2012, N = 573), Garikipati (2008,
N = 291), Goetz and Gupta (1996, N = 275), Holvoet (2005, N = 300), Kremer
et al. (2013, N = 188), McIntosh (2008, N = 380), Rahman (1999, N = 295) and
Tedeschi (2008, N = 393).
Focus group discussions (FGD) were conducted with two groups of women
involved in this study: those who had obtained credit (FGD1) and those who had not
(FGD2). FGD is a method used to collect qualitative data from a small group of
people. It was used in this study to get insightful information about women’s
perceptions of: (a) credit (both individual and group lending) in terms of its utility and
effectiveness; (b) household labour allocation, and women’s decision-making power
with respect to their needs; (c) importance of MFIs; (d) use of loans and income.
3.3 Measures
The objective of this section is to show how we measured women’s empowerment
and assessed the impact of microfinance. To do so, we used exploratory factor
analysis and propensity score matching, respectively. These two methods are
described below.
3.3.1 Exploratory factor analysis
Within a household, a woman’s decision-making power to manage her livelihood is
associated with her being able to choose the type of activity she wants to carry out,
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to freely decide whether to borrow money or not, and to have control over her own
income (cf. Kabeer 2001). To assess women’s empowerment, we used women’s
decision-making power as a proxy. Since the scale items for decision-making power
were never used before, principal components analysis was conducted as an
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to select the factors representing women’s
decision-making power. EFA is considered an appropriate technique to analyse new
measures (Conway and Huffcutt 2003). In the EFA, we do not take into account
heterogeneity of the samples with and without credit. The degree of influence on
household decision-making was measured by ten survey items which were rated on
a 3-point scale (1 = My husband and relatives, 2 = My husband and myself,
3 = Myself). For each item, the information was collected on the basis of women’s
subjective response referring to the situation before credit-taking. Data on
empowerment before taking credit was collected by retrospective questions. In
addition, socio-demographic information was gathered, including household
composition, marriage status, education, ethnicity, female monthly net income,
total female assets, and total household assets.
3.3.2 Microfinance impact assessment
Our impact assessment seeks to address the question of how participants would have
performed in the absence of an MFI programme or how non-participants would
have performed had they participated in the programme. The main problem here is
how to prove that the changes observed in the outcomes can be attributed to
microfinance credit. Characteristics of individuals prior to the participation may
cause self-selection bias, and also the kind of programme intervention and the
environment may lead to programme placement bias and shape intervention
outcomes (Pitt and Khandker 1998; Sebstad and Chen 1996). Self-selection occurs
because of initial differences in characteristics of borrowers and non-borrowers, i.e.,
heterogeneity. For example, female borrowers may have initial entrepreneurial
ability compared to non-borrowers that may enable them to earn a higher income,
even in the absence of MFI credit. Or borrowers may be better off compared to non-
borrowers, especially when access to credit depends on the availability of savings.
So, female borrowers are those who can contribute savings, while those who have
no savings may not participate. The difference in outcomes may also be due to
certain characteristics of MFIs, for example the way they design their credit
programmes. In such a situation, the credit status of women is not randomly
distributed and comparing the mean outcomes of borrowers and non-borrowers will
be subject to bias. Thus, before assessing the impact of MFI credit we first need to
make the two groups comparable.
Different methods have been used to assess the impact of microfinance credit on
the borrowers. One of the simple and widely used methods in the microfinance
literature is to compare programme participants (the treated group) to non-
participants (control group) on key outcomes that are expected to be affected by
participation. However, this method has been criticised (Todd 2008) for ignoring the
selection problem. Another method recently used in impact assessment is propensity
score matching (PSM), which aims at reducing the selection bias. We used it in our
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study to assess the effects of MFI credit on women with respect to a number of
relevant variables. The method is described below.
3.3.3 Propensity score matching (PSM)
Propensity score matching (PSM) is defined as the conditional probability of
receiving treatment given pre-treatment or exogenous individual characteristics
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). In our case we can define PSM as the conditional
probability of a woman obtaining credit from MFIs given certain characteristics such
as age, education level, marital status, ethnicity, etc. The PSM method is a widely used
non-experimental method of evaluation in economic policy that can be implemented
to estimate the average effect of a treatment or programme intervention (Todd 2008).
It helps to adjust initial differences between the treated and control group by matching
participants and controls with similar propensity scores based on observable
characteristics. After the adjustment, any difference in the outcomes between the
two groups can be attributed to the programme or treatment.
Two main assumptions underlie the PSM method. The first is that the selected
exogenous variables simultaneously affect participation and outcomes but are not
influenced by participation in the treatment. The second is that individuals from the
treatment and control groups are comparable before the treatment. According to
Heckman (1979) the latter condition ensures that individuals with the same
observable characteristics have a positive probability of being in both treatment and
control groups. The average treatment effect on the treated group is the difference
between the mean outcomes for matched treated and untreated individuals.
The estimation of the average treatment effect using the PSM method is done
step-wise. First, a propensity score capturing the probability of being treated given a
set of exogenous characteristics is estimated for each group using a probit
regression. Second, individuals are matched on the basis of their predicted
probabilities of participation. Since the probability of observing two observations
with exactly the same value of the propensity score is in principle zero, different
methods are used by which weights are given for matching precision. Here, we use
Kernel Matching (KM), in which all control cases are matched to each treated case
but weighted such that those closest to the treatment case are given the largest
weight. According to Tesfay (2009), KM has the advantage of ensuring low
variance because it uses the weighted average of all individuals in the control group
to construct the counterfactual outcome. To ensure comparability once propensity
scores are estimated and cases are matched, the third step is conducting a t test for
differences in pre-treatment variables between control and treated groups.
To construct a propensity score based on the probability of obtaining MFI credit,
we used the woman’s age, her type of activity, wealth, ethnicity, level of education
and marital status, household size, gender of household head, and decision-making
power within household. These variables are expected to simultaneously influence
the probability of a woman obtaining a loan and the outcomes. The outcomes to be
measured as the effects of microcredit are women’s net income and assets, and
household assets, to be described next.
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3.3.3.1 Income Net income represents the total amount of money earned per
month from agricultural and/or trade activities of women. The monthly time period
has been chosen to compare income of traders who make money every day, with
farmers who earn money per season by selling crops after the harvest.
3.3.3.2 Assets Assets are the basic factors of production, consumption and
investments that are controlled and accessed by the household. The value of assets is
represented by the sum of monetary values (in francs CFA, local currency) of
livestock, equipment, electric appliances and consumer goods that belong to the
household. Several studies have found that the provision of loans for women may
enable them to build up and improve the value of their assets (ADB 2000; Mayoux
1999; Rahman 2004; Van Maanen 2004).
4 Results
4.1 Decision-making power
For the before-MFI credit situation, the factor analysis yielded two factors that explained
43 and 21 % of the item variance, respectively. The items which loaded highly on the
first factor concerned women’s participation in decision making in terms of the use of
household consumption goods and household income, household expenditure on
equipment, schooling of children, and the participation of women in community
activities. This factor was interpreted as a practical gender needs factor (PGN). The
second factor encompassed women’s decision making in terms of borrowing money,
trading goods, and the use of women’s income. This factor was associated with women’s
own business activities reflecting the women’s strategic gender needs (SGN). In Table 5
of the ‘‘Appendix’’ the relevant items are underlined. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability
coefficient for PGN was 0.88, for SGN it was 0.70. Next, the average of the relevant
items was calculated for each factor, both before and after taking credit.
The results of a t test (Table 1) indicates significant differences between the two
situations with respect to the power in decision making related to both SGN
(p\ 0.001) and PGN (p\ 0.001). The results suggest that receiving MFI credit has
resulted in more practical and strategic decision-making power of female borrowers.
Indeed, with the increase in the income they earned from their activities, women
borrowers were able to reinforce their fall-back position. This has led to an
Table 1 Women’s decision-making power before and after obtaining credit
Before obtaining MFI credit After obtaining MFI credit t
Mean SE Mean SE
Practical gender needs 2.216 0.052 2.336 0.048 5.529*
Strategic gender needs 2.800 0.032 2.892 0.019 3.837*
* p\ 0.001; N = 185
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improvement in the women’s power in decision making regarding gender needs,
meaning that women are more likely to make their own decisions about what types
of goods to produce and sell, and, more importantly, they could decide how to use
their loans and their income. Meeting strategic gender needs amounts to
empowerment. It is important for women because it affects the profit they can
make from the MFI services provided for them which, additionally, has a positive
effect on the capability of the credit institutions to financially support women.
It has to be noted that women’s responses to retrospective questions used to
compare decision-making power before and after obtaining MFIs credit, are subject
to recall bias or hindsight bias.1 This would lead to a smaller difference between the
situations before and after obtaining MFI credit. However, our result showed a
significant difference in gender need variables between the two situations.
4.2 Results of MFI empowerment
4.2.1 Socio-demographic characteristics
Table 2 shows the socio-demographic characteristics of women who have obtained
MFI credit and women without MFI credit. It shows both the unmatched and
matched variable means. From the unmatched sample, we can conclude that women
who obtained MFI credit are likely to be adult Agni female household heads with
few household members. They have more power in decision making within the
household than women without credit. In the matched sample there is no significant
difference between the two groups of women with respect to the variables in the
table. This means that the bias of having women with and without credit was
reduced and that, therefore, the treatment and the control groups are now
comparable on the basis of the selected pre-treatment characteristics.
4.2.2 Factors explaining women’s access to MFI credit
Table 3 shows the estimated probit regression model for obtaining microcredit. It
indicates that Agni women and those who have more power in decision-making are
more likely to obtain credit. Agni is the principal ethnic group in the study area, and
this fact may give Agni women a better chance to be well informed about the services
offered by MFI, as most of the MFI agents in the region belong to this group. There
may be a positive discrimination in favour of Agni women in the process of credit
provision as reported during the focus group discussion. Decision-making power in
terms of SGN is positively linked to obtaining MFI credit. Women with more power in
decision-making, have more chance to obtain MFI credit. As explained above, when a
woman has power within the household, she can efficiently invest her money and
make a profit. MFIs will therefore prefer such a woman in whom they will have more
confidence. As predicted, women with a large household size are less likely to obtain
1 Hindsight bias refers to the tendency people have to view events as more predictable than they really
are. People often recall their predictions before the event as much stronger than they actually were. With
hindsight people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated with foresight (Fischhoff
1980).
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MFI credit. The same holds true for married women and female household heads.
Contrary to what we expected, neither the level of education nor age was significant.
Hence, in our study, these two variables did not affect or explain MFI credit taking.
Table 2 Socio-demographic characteristics of women with and without MFI credit













Age in years 42.21 39.46 2.31* 41.2 41.3 0.10




0.43 0.27 3.36** 0.41 0.40 0.25
Married woman
(dummy)b












-0.08 0.16 2.32* -0.05 -0.04 0.11
Ethnicity: Agnid 0.91 0.66 6.23** 0.90 0.92 0.66
* p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01
Reference categories a male household head, b single, c illiterate, d other ethnic groups
Table 3 Probit model of obtaining MFI credit
Probability of obtaining MFI credit
Coefficient Z
Age 0.034 0.87
Age squared -0.0003 0.69
Household size -0.073 2.25*
Female household heada 0.388 1.83
Power of decision-making (SGN) 0.314 3.47**
Power of decision-making (PGN) 0.038 0.35
Married woman (dummy)b 0.377 1.86
Primary education (dummy)c -0.201 1.24
Ethnicity: Agni (dummy)d 1.058 5.09**
Constant term -1.683 1.96*
* p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01
Reference categories a male household head, b single, c illiterate, d other ethnic groups
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4.2.3 Effects of MFI credit on income and assets
The effects of MFI credit, after controlling for potential bias, are shown in Table 4.
These effects are the differences in outcomes between the groups of women with and
without MFI credit, respectively. A positive difference for a particular outcome
means that participation in MFI credit has led to a positive change in that particular
outcome that can be attributed to receiving MFI credit. The results indicate that the
difference in income between matched groups of women who received MFI credit
and women without MFI credit is positive. This means that female borrowers on
average earned more income than non-borrowers. Thus, we can say that MFI credit
has helped women to improve the level of their income. Furthermore, the table shows
that after propensity score matching, the value of women’s assets did not significantly
differ between the two groups but a positive difference in the value of household
assets was found. This result shows that female borrowers use their income for buying
household assets (e.g., bed, chair, hoe, radio set) rather than goods for themselves
(e.g., clothing, jewellery). Since women lack control over the household’s land size
and land use, they would not be inclined to invest their own income in land and
agriculture. Thus, participation in MFI credit resulted in an increase in the value of
household assets. This was corroborated by the focus group discussion in which
women reported that their main objective for taking credit was to contribute to
household livelihood and consumption and to be able to take care of their children.
5 Conclusion
The results indicated that MFIs that manage loan repayments properly are likely to be
effective in enhancing women’s income. However, access and use of MFI credit in
rural areas did not significantly increase the value of women’s assets although it did
significantly enhance the value of household assets. These results differ from the
finding of several studies that the provision of credit enables women to build up and
improve the value of their assets (Mayoux 1999; Rahman 2004; Van Maanen 2004).
First, an individual or household with access to credit is more likely to earn income.
Table 4 Average effects of obtaining MFI credit on a set of outcomes












50,179 29,331 20,448 4.53** 49,648 31,964 17,684 3.27**
Women’s assets
(FCFA)
39,807 21,880 17,927 1.49 41,662 25,667 15,995 1.20
Household assets
(FCFA)
552,312 312,721 239,591 2.15* 431,465 249,839 181,626 3.07**
FCFA Francs Communaute´ Financie`re Africaine (African Franc)
* p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01
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Second, higher income enables women to build up their assets. Although this paper
provides evidence of the positive relationship between MFI credit and women’s
income, it also reveals that female borrowers were more likely to use their earned
income to improve the household’s standard of living than to build up their own assets.
However, this could strengthen their bargaining position in the household (Agarwal
1997) and, if so, would be a form of ‘‘transformative agency’’ or empowerment
(Kabeer 2005). This idea is consistent with research among German couples where the
wealth gap between household partners was the smallest in low-wealth households
where the women had control over money management (Grabka et al. 2013).
Our findings about the effects of MFI credit on women’s empowerment show that
women gained decision-making power on issues pertaining to both their practical
and strategic gender needs. The results also indicate that women with more strategic
power are more likely to have access to MFI credit. This is because empowered
women can efficiently invest their money and make a profit without the interference
of their husbands nor any other family members and relatives. Hence, in the case
presented in this paper, women’s empowerment as a result of having access to and
benefitting from microfinance could lead to ‘‘change in the structures of patriarchy’’
(Kabeer 2005: 16). We did not find evidence of pseudo-empowerment or the
women-disempowering effect as reported elsewhere (Kabeer 2001; Armenda`riz and
Roome 2008). The results highlight the potential of MFIs as a tool for development.
In her discussion about the importance of women’s empowerment and development
Kabeer (2005) underlines the role of resources through which agency can be
exercised and empowerment attained. MFIs provide access to financial resources
and enable women to generate new resources and assets. Therefore, the promotion
of MFIs should be taking into account in the strategic plans of governments that
address the contribution of women to development. In Coˆte d’Ivoire, this line is
followed. Women’s access to credit has become a priority in national policies and
special funds are released to support women’s income-generating activities,
including the Support Fund for Women of Coˆte d’Ivoire (FAFCI). The fund aims
to facilitate women’s access to credit, especially for the poorest women, through
microfinance institutions that use low-interest rates. To date, many women have
benefited from this fund. Such opportunities will help women to generate income,
support their families and contribute to their own empowerment, provided the credit
is effectively used and the institutions are properly managed. These results are in
line with the ones obtained by Holvoet (2005) for South India and Kabeer (2001) for
rural Bangladesh in their empirical research on empowerment of women and MFI.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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